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REFLECTIONS ON DEVELOPING TRENDS
IN THE LAW OF STUDENT RIGHTS *
STEPHEN

R. GOLDSTEIN t

This past year has witnessed a spurt of interest in the law concerning rights of public school students, an interest coinciding with, and
possibly attributable to, the increasing number of judicial decisions in
favor of students' "rights" vis-4-vis school administrations. Rather
than attempt to enumerate and dissect the myriad of recent decisions,
this Paper presents in a general manner my views on developing
judicial trends in this area. First, however, it may be well to place
the current developments in historical perspective. Today's growing
judicial involvement in the field of public education is not unprecedented.
In the late nineteenth century and the early part of this century, a
regular pattern of decisions developed in which school administration
rules and regulations that went beyond the scope of school power as
the courts saw it were held invalid.
These cases were consistent with the prevailing judicial skepticism
of any government interference with "rights" of citizens, a philosophy
most dramatically revealed in the economic substantive due process
cases. Indeed, the landmark school law constitutional cases-Pierce v.
Society of Sisters' and leyer v. Nebraska 2 -were couched in the
same substantive due process terms as were the cases that declared
invalid state attempts to regulate the economy. During this era, courts,
reluctant to acknowledge the regulatory powers of either the state or
the instrumentalities to which it delegated authority, also struck down
school board regulations concerning such things as compulsory vaccinations,' membership in secret societies,4 and penalties for accidentally
damaging school property, on the grounds that such regulations went
* This Paper was originally presented in November, 1969, as a lecture to the School
Solicitor's Association of Pennsylvania.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B., 1959, LL.B.,
1962, University of Pennsylvania. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1268 U.S. 510 (1925).
2262 U.S. 390 (1923).
3 See, e.g., Mathews v. Board of Educ., 127 Mich. 530, 86 N.W. 1036 (1901).
Accord, Potts v. Breen, 167 Ill. 67, 47 N.E. 81 (1897) (health department regulation).
4See Wright v. Board of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43 (1922).
But see
Wilson v. Board of Educ., 233 Ill. 464, 84 N.E. 697 (1908); Wayland v. Board of
School Directors, 43 Wash. 441, 86 P. 642 (1906).
5See Holman v. School Trustees, 77 Mich. 605, 43 N.W. 996 (1889) ; State v.
Vanderbilt, 116 Ind. 11, 18 N.E. 266 (1888) ; Perkins v. Board of Directors, 56 Iowa
476, 9 N.W. 356 (1880).
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beyond the scope of the power delegated to school boards under
state law.
From the end of this period (sometime in the 1930's) until very
recently, intense judicial scrutiny and skepticism of governmental action
gave way to great judicial deference to administrative and other governmental decision-making. We experienced the heyday of our faith in
the administrative process and the judgment of professionals and
specialists, a faith reflected in judicial attitudes toward school administrative decision-making. Judicial deference was reinforced in the school
context by a specific faith in the quality of American education. Thus,
school regulations were consistently upheld on the ground that they
were not "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable," I although courts never
explored whether or not the rules performed a proper educational
function. Moreover, even if a court did inquire into the purposes and
objectives of the rule, it would invariably accept without question the
school administration's conjectures about the dangers to which the
educational process would have been exposed had the regulations in
question not been adopted and enforced. 7
Very recently, we have entered a third era in which the pendulum
is swinging back toward our initial skepticism. The reasons for this
swing are many. First, our former faith in expertise and the administrative process in general has diminished. Not only have we suffered
many failures by agencies to accomplish their goals, but we have also
seen that in many areas the work of the agency may even tend to
destroy the humanity of the group which it seeks to help.
Second, that faith in American education which once reinforced
general confidence in the administrative process has been remore
a
placed by growing doubts about the ability of public education to
perform its function of educating our children. While the most notable
failure of the system has been its inability to educate the black and the
poor, there has also been questioning and doubt concerning the operations of public education in white middle-class suburbs. In part,
these doubts grow out of the more general reexamination of societal
I Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 1267, 147 N.W.2d 854, 858 (1967) ;
see McLean Indep. School Dist. v. Andrews, 333 S.W2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960) ; State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 34, 302
S.W.2d 57, 59 (1957); Casey County Bd. of Educ. v. Luster, 282 S.W2d 333, 334
(Ky. 1955).
7
See, e.g., Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E2d 468 (1965);
Fitzpatrick v. Board of Educ., 54 Misc. 2d 1085, 284 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
A notable exception in this era of great judicial deference to school administrators
is the decision of the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943). Yet, even this case was preceded by a contrary decision only
three years earlier in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). Also,
even when reading Barnette today, one is struck by how much this remarkable opinion
was a reflection of the Court's strong antipathy to the then current supranationalism
embodied in fascism.
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values and aims that we are currently undergoing. But they also reflect the increased sophistication and intellectual age of many students
today.
Finally, since Brown v. Board of Education8 was decided in 1954,
the courts have been heavily involved in matters concerning public
education. It is not surprising that their involvement in segregation
problems made the courts more responsive to other problems of public
education. It is more than coincidence, for example, that a large number of the leading procedural due process cases concerning suspension
or expulsion of students involve substantial racial elements.9 As stated
above, these factors have led us into a new epoch of judicial involvement
in public education. Without trying to be definitive, I would like to
suggest a few of the major trends in this new era.
First, there is a growing recognition that students cannot be regarded as merely passive vessels into which education is poured, but
must, at least to a limited extent, be regarded as active participants in
the educational process. To oversimplify, education can be divided,
for analytical purposes, into two models: prescriptive and analytic. In
the prescriptive model, information and accepted truths are furnished to
a theoretically passive, absorbent student. The teacher's role is to
convey these truths rather than to create new wisdom. Both teacher
and student appear almost as automatons. Analytic education, however, signifies the examination of data and values in a way that involves
the student and teacher as active participants in the search for truth.
While these polar models represent only a theoretical paradigm that
can never exist in pure form, we have traditionally conceived of precollege public education as essentially prescriptive, and college and postgraduate studies as analytic.
Now, however, one senses that the courts, along with the rest
of society, see these lines (which were never clearly drawn to begin
with) becoming more and more blurred. With greater numbers of
people going to college today than ever before, with more and more
college remedial programs available for the poor and disadvantaged,
and with the creation of new institutions such as junior and community
colleges, many colleges may be moving somewhat from the analytic
model, once envisioned as the ideal for higher education, toward the
prescriptive secondary school model.
Paradoxically, and more important from the point of view of
student "rights," a strong movement exists at the moment to make
8347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9
See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961);
Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968) (Spanish-speaking) ; cf. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
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high schools more analytic. Many high school students today are
intellectually more mature than their college counterparts of a generation ago. The influences of television and other mass media on the
perspectives of even our very young children are pervasive. Possessed
of heretofore unparallelled training and maturity, today's high school
student may be dissatisfied with the traditional mode of public education.
Sympathetic concern for student unhappiness, as well as impatience
with a primarily prescriptive model of high school education, finds
judicial expression in cases like Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
0
As Mr. Justice Fortas stated for the
Community School District."
Court:
In our system, students may not be regarded as closedcircuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of
those sentiments that are officially approved."
Recognition of the necessity for public education to assume more of
the characteristics of the analytic model is also apparent in the adoption
of new and more permissive rules concerning student expression by
such school districts as Philadelphia and New York.
The second major trend is no less paradoxical: while we have
experienced a growing lack of faith in the current educational structure,
at the same time our belief in the importance of public education to the
students involved has increased. Both tendencies contribute to a growing judicial reluctance to accept long-term suspensions or expulsion as
appropriate school sanctions. This reluctance exhibits itself both in
cases requiring greater procedural safeguards for implementing such
sanctions, and in decisions striking down substantive rules, the violation
12
of which is punished by either a long-term suspension or expulsion.
U.S. 503 (1969).
11 Id. at 511. Although this Paper is concerned with student rights, it should be
noted that the trend toward a more analytic secondary school situation might also
affect the rights of teachers. The basic doctrines of teacher academic freedom have
been developed at the college level. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) ; Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HA v. L. REv. 1045, 1065-84
(1968). Yet, although it managed to avoid the ultimate question, the Supreme Court
in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05, 107, again through Mr. Justice Fortas,
seemed not to see a distinction between higher and lower education, and pointedly
hinted at the extension of teacher academic freedom into secondary school classrooms.
12 These cases can be divided into two groups: (1) those in which the underlying
basis for the substantive rule is quite doubtful, and (2) ones in which the court clearly
accepts the underlying rule but finds the penalty of long-term suspension or expulsion
too drastic a sanction. For the first type, compare, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Bentley,
383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1964); McLeod v. State ex rel. Colmer, 154 Miss. 468, 122 So.
737 (1929), with Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967) ;
State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 189 N.E2d 181 (1962). An
example of the second type is found in the recent case of Anderson v. Independent
School Dist. No. 281, No. 656514 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Juv. Div., Feb. 18, 1969), currently
on appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court. In Anderson, the court accepted the
validity of a school's no-smoking rule but struck down a long-term suspension for a
second offense.
10 393
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Whether one characterizes attendance at a public school as a
"right" or a "privilege," it is of great value to the student. In light
of this country's general norm of universal public education,13 longterm suspension or expulsion must bear a heavy burden to justify
subordinating the interest of the student by deviating from this norm.
Indeed, the schools themselves agree with and contribute to this feeling.
It is not surprising that judges, who have witnessed intensive school
campaigns to convince drop-outs to return to school because of the
crucial significance of education in our society, react unsympathetically
to school action suspending or expelling students for minor infractions
of school rules and to attempts by school administrators to deprive
students of access to school without first affording them adequate procedural safeguards.
The third major trend, a growing recognition that students and
their parents have rights of privacy that should not be unduly interfered with by the state or the school structure, is part of a general
movement that affects many other areas of jurisprudence in addition
to school law. Perhaps the trend can be best illustrated by comparing
early judicial decisions regarding hair and dress regulations with more
recent ones. The 1965 decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
Leonard v. School Committee "4is typical of what we can now call
"early" decisions in this area. In upholding the indefinite suspension
of a high school boy because his hair was too long, the court's conception of the role of the judiciary in reviewing decisions of school
administrators was that:
[W]e need only perceive some rational basis for the rule
requiring acceptable haircuts in order to sustain its validity.
Conversely, only if convinced that the regulation of pupils'
hair styles and lengths could have no reasonable connection
with the successful
operation of a public school could we hold
5
otherwise.1

By awarding an almost absolute deference to the school administration,
the court failed to demonstrate that it was at all aware of the countervailing factor that dress and appearance is an area of life ordinarily left
to private decision-making. It therefore avoided the difficult question
whether, under our total legal system, and the presumptions of the
13 See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate
Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373,
393-94 n.74 (1969).
14 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E2d 468 (1965).
15 Id. at 709, 212 N.E.2d at 472. See also Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist.,
261 F. Supp. 545, (N.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 392 F2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 856 (1968) ; Davis v. Firment. 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967) ; Akin v. Board
of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968).
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societal and governmental systems within which it exists, the interest
of the school system outweighs that of the student and his parent in
making private decisions regarding personal appearance.10
In contrast with early cases like Leonard are the ever-increasing
number of recent cases, decided by both state and federal courts, that
strike down school regulations restricting hair and dress choices of
students and their parents.17 These recent cases, whether decided on
constitutional grounds or based on an analysis of the state law power
of school boards-' (which I believe is the better reasoning), are much
more discriminating in their approach. Rather than merely comparing
a regulation to some abstract quality of reasonableness or arbitrariness,
current judicial scrutiny includes an examination of its asserted purpose
and effect, the factual bases underlying this assertion, and the countervailing factors such as privacy and individual decision-making that are
displaced if the rule is upheld. In essence, the courts not only are
seeking to ask the hard questions that the Leonard case and other
early decisions avoided, but are also striving to answer them by weighing all of the relevant factors in order to reach an optimal balance. In
resolving each case and reaching this often delicate balance, the courts
are heavily influenced by a growing general feeling that in our society,
privacy and individuality need protection.
These hair and dress cases, as well as Tinker, also exhibit the
final and most important trend discussed here: the increasing demand
that school administration justify a regulation, not by conjecturing
about the adverse consequences to the educational structure without the
rule, but by presenting hard facts. Contrary to the beliefs of many
people, the courts are not so much saying that the schools cannot act
to achieve traditional aims-to prevent disruption, for example-but
they are saying that they will no longer take an administrator's unsupported word that absent a given rule, regulation, or procedure,
disruption will take place.
One example of the new judicial philosophy is Breen v. Kahl, 9 in
which a school district tried to support a restriction on long hair on
16 See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 399-400, 420-422.
' 7 See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969) ; Griffin v.
Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D.
Wis.), aff'd, 38 U.S.L.W. 2332 (7th Cir., Dec. 3, 1969); Meyers v. Arcata Union
High School Dist., - Cal. App. 2d -, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969) ; Cirker v. Yohe, No.
2108 (C.P. Chester Co., Pa. 1969). But see Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D.
Ind. 1969). See also In re Johnson, No. 8023 (N.Y. Comm. of Educ., July 25, 1969);
In re Myers, No. 8021 (N.Y. Comm. of Educ., July 25, 1969).
Note that these recent hair and dress judicial decisions were foreshadowed by the
1967 decision of the State Board of Education of New Jersey, Pelletreau v. Board
of Educ., N.J. Bd. of Educ., Sept. 6, 1967. See also, It re Dalrymple, 5 N.Y. E.
DEP'T REP. 113 (1966).
-8 See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 376-77.
19 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis.), aff'd, 38 U.S.L.W. 2332 (7th Cir., Dec. 3, 1969).
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the usual ground that it would distract other students and thereby
disrupt the school process. The district court faced the issue not by
unquestioning deference to the "professional" judgment of the administrators, but by carefully examining the factual record for evidence of
disruption, disorder, or distraction. It is not surprising that the court
found it wanting. In the words of the court:
With respect to the "distraction" factor, the showing in
this record consists of expressions of opinion by several educational administrators that an abnormal appearance of one
student distracts others. There is no direct testimony that
such distraction has occurred. There has been no offer of
the results of any empirical studies on the subject by educators, psychologists, psychiatrists, or other experts. Even
in the opinions which have been received in evidence, there
has been no amplification with respect to what portion of the
students are susceptible to such distraction, how frequently
susceptible students are likely to be distracted for this reason,
how quickly or slowly high school students accommodate to
individual differences in appearance, or how the distraction
actually manifests itself in terms of the behavior of the distracted students in various learning situations. From the
testimony of the educational administrators, it appears that
the absence of such amplification is not accidental; it arises
from the absence of factual data which might provide the
amplification."0
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Tinker rejected the school administration's "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance" as a
basis for prohibiting the wearing of black armbands by students.2 1
Two corollaries to the demand that hard facts be presented if a
school rule is to be upheld as necessary to prevent disruption deserve
further mention. The first is a suggestion that the alleged disruption
must be substantial. Because they are not totally removed from reality,
judges know that the public school system tolerates many and varied
disruptions during the course of a school year. It is not unusual for
students to be dismissed from school early to go to football games, or
to be sent from class to go to the lavatory, the principal's office, or to
take a note to another teacher. They are constantly moving and
talking in the halls while switching classes, going to lunch, and so
forth. Furthermore, students occasionally leave school early for vacations and return late for no more significant reason than their parents'
convenience. All these disruptions and more are commonly accepted by
the school system. Thus, it is not surprising that a court questions the
20 Id. at 709.
21393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
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validity of a presentation in which the school administration portrays
the school as an island of pristine calm and precision in which long
hair, or the absence of a child on a demonstration day, is seriously
disruptive. The challenge to education, as it has been traditionally
recognized, is not to eliminate all disruptions, but to use them creatively.
The other side effect of the demand for hard facts may be more
difficult for school administrators to accept. More and more, courts
are refusing to allow schools to penalize a student for violating a school
rule where the rationale for punishment is an assertion that the failure
to so punish would make the principal or school board lose face, which
would itself disrupt or impede appropriate school functions. As the
district court stated in Breen:
The point made about discipline seems to be that the disciplinary powers of the school authorities will be diminished
if this Board regulation is not upheld and these expulsions
and threatened expulsions are not vindicated by the court.
Obviously the relationship of students, faculty, administrators, and school board will be affected in some degree by
a judicial declaration of invalidity of a school board regulation. But if the regulation is fairly found to violate the
Constitution, responsibility for these consequences rests with
the agency which promulgated the regulation. So far as
education of young people in obedience is concerned, it is
important for them to appreciate the present vitality of our
proud tradition that although we respect government in the
exercise of its constitutional powers, we jealously guard our
freedoms from its attempts to exercise unconstitutional
powers.
There is a significant distinction between disruption
which may be caused by the wearing of long hair, on the
one hand, and disruption which may be caused by the very
fact that a student has violated any Board rule, on the other.
That disruption of the latter type may occur obviously affords
no support for constitutionality of the regulation itself.'
To summarize briefly the importance of these developments for
school officials and the attorneys who advise them, I believe that they
signify and remind us of the need to adopt newer, more flexible responses to student requests for opportunities for expression. Rather
than deny a student request because the proposal has never been tried
before, administrators must attempt to grapple with a new idea in
22296 F. Supp. at 708 & n.8. See also Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60, 63
(M.D. Ala. 1969): "In this case, it was the school officials who created what Judge
Tuttle . . . accurately described as 'something of a tempest in a teapot' and it is
they who must accept responsibility for the consequences."
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order to determine with some fairness whether it can be tried, or more
important, whether it can be utilized to increase the efficacy of the
educational process.
Confrontations should be avoided. Therefore, plans for change
should be undertaken in advance of student demands; all levels of the
school structure, including the teacher level, should be made aware
of this need. It is probably too late to save a situation once an
administrator has said no when he should not have. After that, the
question shifts from the desirability and feasibility of the request to
the desirability and feasibility of the administration backing down. It
is clearly too late to save a situation once a school is in court with
a weak case.
All of these developments make life much harder for school administrators. In the face of this new situation there is a danger of
going to one of two extremes. The obvious danger of a school digging
in its heels and fighting these trends has been discussed above. A
less obvious but still real danger exists of drifting to the other extreme
by adopting the attitude that since courts have "handcuffed" school
administrators, the administrators must give up educational leadership
in the field of student expression. What we must recognize is that
freedom of student expression is not intended as, and should not be
interpreted as, an encouragement of license. On the contrary, by freeing students from coercive school rules we will, or at least we intend
to, establish a point at which free men begin to assume the selfresponsibility that is the essential function of education in this area.
It is, of course, much easier to censor a school newspaper than to teach
students the concepts of good taste and responsibility which obviate the
need for censorship. Yet, this latter method must be the educational
norm in a free society. It is, in the words of the Supreme Court, the
"slow and easily neglected route" 2 to which we are committed.
23Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943). The Court was here
contrasting the quick but invalid route to instilling patriotism through use of a compulsory flag salute with the slower, harder, but better route of teaching about American
society and its traditions. See also the statement of the then New York City Superintendent of Schools, Bernard E. Donovan, that "a program of education rather than
punitive action" is the proper approach to hair and dress problems. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 13, 1966, at 9, col. 5.

